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INTRODUCTION
The Edwards Aquifer or Underground River is badly over-drafted.  Pumping is unregulated, and the adverse effects
of pumping are not built into the costs of pumping that the pumper must pay.  An Edwards irrigator pays only his cost
to lift -- not the cost of covering San Antonio against movement of the bad-water line (a fresh water - saline water
boundary).  San Antonio pays only its cost to lift, subject to its judgment of where the bad-water line constraint should
call for restraint -- not the cost to endangered species or to downstream water users.  No one is in charge of the
Edwards water resource, and the existing market results in a tragedy of the commons.
Through a seven year struggle involving federal and state courts, federal and state agencies, local governments, and
the Texas legislature, the Edwards is moving toward integrated water resource (and broader ecosystem) management.
We can use the Edwards to understand the nature of legal impediments to integrated water resource management.
By "integrated" water resource management we mean, or should mean, both (1) conjunctive management of
hydrologically connected surface and underground water, and (2) management that takes account of all the widely
different impacts our uses of water resources may have.
The major legal impediments to integrated water resource management result from:
(1) geographic fragmentation of decision-making responsibility for hydrologically-based ecosystems;
(2) issue fragmentation of decision-making within any given geographic jurisdiction among multiple overlapping
decision-making institutions, each with a different mission and different expertise; and
(3) failure of most relevant laws to help decision-makers integrate environmental and other untraded costs and
benefits into the market system.
The Edwards illustrates all three problems, and also illustrates how creative use of ecosystem-based laws offer hopes
of overcoming them.
GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES
Private land ownership patterns rarely if ever coincide with hydrological system boundaries.  Except where all the
relevant land is owned by the federal government, water resource conflicts among private owners are built into land
titles.
All sorts of public institutions, federal, state and local, have decision-making authority that affect water resource
management.  In the case of the Edwards, these include:
-- the federal government (e.g., the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS")
-- the state government (e.g., the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission ("TNRCC")
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-- regional and local governments (e.g., the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, the City of San Antonio, the
Medina and Uvalde County Underground Water Conservation Districts).
The geographic boundaries of public entities rarely if ever match hydrological realities.  This is because geographic
boundaries result from political and economic processes that are, hydrologically speaking, arbitrary.  Note how often
we have used rivers as boundary lines.  From a hydrological perspective, and an ecological one, this is the worst
possible way to divide decision-making authority.
For all hydrologically based ecosystems, the federal and state geographical boundaries are "over-inclusive."  They
include millions of acres and humans whose activities have nothing to do with any specific hydrological system, e.g.,
the Edwards.  This matters because mental, legal and political agendas are limited.  Entirely proper concerns of federal
and state decision-makers for other people and problems divide their attention.  Just getting on a federal or state
agency's agenda for an Edwards problem is hard.  In the case of the Edwards, it has taken litigation.
Regional and local entities tend to be "under-inclusive."  The City of San Antonio, for instance, has enormous impact
on Edwards matters, and a strong self-interest in Edwards matters, but San Antonio's self-interest is much narrower
than its impacts.  Any mayor of San Antonio is understandably tempted to view downstream Guadalupe River concerns
and upstream irrigator concerns as hostile -- to be fought, or if necessary negotiated with, but not as goals of San
Antonio decision-making.  Edwards irrigators, similarly, tend to set protection of irrigation water and profits as the
only legitimate interest.
Some entities are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.  An Edwards example is the Medina County Underground
Water Conservation District ("MCUWCD"), the entity that sued to block the Edwards Aquifer Authority, an attempt
to create a regional water management entity.  MCUWCD is under-inclusive in that it has no incentive to regard non-
Medina County interests in the Edwards as legitimate.  It is over-inclusive in that its boundaries include some (e.g.,
south of the bad-water line) who have no stake in the Edwards but who may want to use MCUWCD for leverage, or
whom Edwards irrigators in MCUWCD can hold hostage.
For integrated water resource management purposes, the proper boundaries for the Edwards would include all of the
watershed area in the Hill Country that feeds the surface streams whose waters recharge the Edwards; the recharge
zone itself; the area underlain by the Aquifer; the springs at which the waters of the Edwards emerge if pumping does
not intercept them first; the Guadalupe river basin whose base flows the springs furnish; and the bay into which the
Guadalupe flows.  More broadly, it would include the basins of the rivers that recharge the Edwards, whose waters if
they do not recharge the Edwards contribute to those rivers' streamflows and bays.
Before the passage of S.B. 1477, known as the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, no entity came close to having these
boundaries.  Under S.B. 1477, the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) has boundaries that include substantial key
portions of the Edwards ecosystem.
The usual way to describe what is needed here is "conjunctive management" of surface water and hydrologically
connected underground water.  Arrangements for such management are common west of Texas but not universal.  One
useful approach is that of the State of New Mexico.  (1)
There the State Engineer has the responsibility to declare and determine the boundaries of groundwater basins.  Within
each declared basin, the State Engineer regulates pumping to serve multiple broad public interest goals, subject to
limits imposed by the legal duty to "keep the river whole" -- to protect senior rights in any hydrologically connected
surface waters against erosion by uncompensated pumping.  The limits that the State Engineer imposes result in a
market system by which growing cities buy and retire irrigation rights.
ISSUE BOUNDARIES
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With two principal exceptions, the federal, state, regional and local institutions that have decision-making authority
over some or all of the Edwards, geographically, are all more or less narrowly focused special-interest institutions.
Some agencies are responsible for specific types of economic interests (e.g., agricultural interests and U.S. Department
of Agriculture), economic interests generally (the Texas Water Development Board), environmental interests generally
(Environmental Protection Agency), wildlife (Texas Parks and Wildlife), and some for geographically limited economic
and environmental interests (San Antonio).
The two exceptions are Congress and the Texas legislature.  They face constitutional limits on subject-matter
jurisdiction that are real, but the reach of their legal and political authority is enormously broader than those of the
agencies and political subdivisions they create.
The role of the Texas Water Commission ("TWC")/TNRCC in the Edwards illustrates the important difference between
legal authority and political authority.  The TWC/TNRCC undoubtedly has legal authority under which it could address
the problems of excessive Edwards pumping.  The TWC proposed in 1992 to do so by rule based on an underground
river finding.  The TNRCC still has that authority, but withdrew the rule when S.B. 1477 expressed legislative
preference for the EAA approach.  The TNRCC still has water quality rulemaking authority, which in view of the bad-
water line it should certainly exercise.  Under political pressure coordinated by the Agriculture Commissioner and the
Attorney General, however, the TNRCC has abandoned any effort to help solve the problems of the Edwards, even in
the current crisis.
Twenty or thirty years ago, most federal and state agencies had missions assigned by the Congress or state legislature
that were narrow to the point of tunnel vision.  USDA, for instance, was charged with maximizing farmer productivity
and supporting farmer income.  Except to the extent that these missions themselves turned out to conflict (productivity
gains depressed prices and favored larger farmers), USDA succeeded -- but at a staggering price in off-farm
environmental terms.  (2)  The job of the TWDB, similarly, was to build reservoirs, whatever the environmental costs
and whatever the comparative economics of conservation.
Agencies with narrow subject-matter focuses result in part from natural features of human thinking.  We tell ourselves
"one problem at a time," "first things first," "we need an expert."  They also result from natural features of the political
process.  Any specific constituency (such as farmers) wants an agency to serve its interests and solve its problems, not
someone else's.  Any agency that wants to survive needs to show its core constituency that it delivers for them.
The result is an assortment of government agencies that not only have hydrologically harmful geographical boundaries,
but also different subject matter constituencies, missions, and expertise.  Integrated water resource or ecosystem
management is unlikely to emerge naturally from interactions among such agencies.  If, as a society, we want
integrated water resource management we have to change the system of relationships among such agencies, or create
new agencies that are designed for that purpose.
REQUIRING INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS INTO THE MARKET AND
THE GOVERNMENT
In various ways, we have tried to add new environmental missions to existing agencies.
First, beginning in 1969, through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Congress required all federal
agencies to consider the environmental consequences of major federal actions.  (3)  NEPA helped.  NEPA created a
level of expertise in and attention to environmental issues that had not existed before.  Under NEPA, this expertise
developed not only in EPA, but inside each more narrowly-focused agency.  Because most major state, local and even
private projects have federal funding or requires federal permits, NEPA also prompted the development of
environmental expertise in state and local agencies, and in the private sector.  Because NEPA's required environmental
consideration could be litigated, and because environmental litigation is newsworthy, NEPA also prompted a measure
of environmental expertise in the courts and in the media.  But NEPA was not enough.  NEPA required only
consideration.  When push came to shove, every mission agency would sacrifice as much of any concerns that were
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not those of its core constituency and mission as it thought it could explain with a straight face to a reviewing court
and a newspaper.
Second, we have also added new environmental missions to specific agencies.  The on-farm and off-farm
environmental missions added to USDA beginning in the 1980's illustrate this approach.  (An important example is
the Conservation Reserve Program.  (4))  These decisions have also helped, creating agency constituencies for and
expertise in these new missions.  But core missions remain core missions, and this approach remains ad hoc and
fragmented by subject-matter.  The Edwards again is a good example.  USDA wants to spend environmental money
on brush-clearing in the Hill Country.  This approach is environmentally problematic for terrestrial species.  It saves
water when we need it least (when rainfall and recharge are good).  Additional water recharged this way costs three
to four times what Edwards irrigation water saved by USDA cost-shared conservation costs.  Edwards irrigation water
conservation has no adverse effects on terrestrial species and saves the most water when we need it most (when it
doesn't rain and farmers therefore irrigate).  But brush-clearing offers USDA a way to deliver money to a constituency
(ranchers) it cannot reach with irrigation cost-sharing.
Even within a single agency, there remain significant cognitive fragmentations.  EPA, for instance, had to be sued to
get it to consider aquatic species impacts in its implementation of Clean Water Act mandates.  USDA's Natural
Resources Conservation Services is, relatively speaking, conservation minded; the Farm Services Agency, which has
so far had responsibility for administering the Conservation Reserve Program, is not.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) tries a third approach.  (5)  The ESA keys on endangered species, and recognizes
that a wide range of human activities may endanger them directly or by harming the ecosystems on which they depend.
The ESA therefore requires everyone - federal, state, local and private -- not to harm individual members of a listed
species, including by modification of their habitat.  This ESA provision (section 9) was the part upheld by the Supreme
Court in the Sweet Home case.  (6)  Among the losers were the timber companies (who said only shooting owls should
count as a violation of § 9) and the Texas Attorney General (who said that pumping from an Aquifer that dries up the
springs where an endangered fish lives shouldn't count as a violation of § 9).  Section 9 is also the subject of the newest
Edwards case, filed against all the major pumpers and representatives of all types of pumpers.  Sierra Club v. San
Antonio, No. MO-96-CA-97 (W.D. Tex.)  (7)
ESA § 7(a)(2) also requires every federal agency to insure that actions it funds, authorizes or carries out are not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of the species.  This part of the ESA was the subject of the first ESA case to reach
the Supreme Court, the case involving the Tellico Dam and the snail darter.  (8)  ESA § 7(a)(2) has also been at the
heart of the northern spotted owl and Pacific salmon cases.
ESA § 7(a)(1) requires every federal agency to affirmatively carry out programs to conserve listed species.  ESA §
7(a)(1) has not been the direct subject of a Supreme Court decision.  It is one important subject of the other current
Edwards case, Sierra Club and Clark Hubbs v. Glickman, No. MO-65-CA-091 (W.D. Tex.).  (9)  J.B. Ruhl, formerly
of Fulbright & Jaworski's Austin office and now a law professor at Southern Illinois, has recently published a law
review article on the importance and value of ESA § 7(a)(1).  (10)
ESA § 4 requires a mission agency whose constituency consists of those who care about endangered species and
ecosystem protection (the FWS, or the NMFS) to develop and implement a recovery plan, and to consult with federal
action agencies to make sure they take the ESA and its concerns seriously.  The recovery planning duty was the subject
of Sierra Club v. Babbitt, the original Edwards ESA case that ended in early 1996.  (11)
As these cases suggest, the ESA works only if someone enforces it.  That requires citizen suits.
If there is someone willing to sue, the ESA provides a mechanism that in fact can and frequently does compel the large
grab-bag of geographically fragmented and narrowly focused decision-making agencies to focus on an ecosystem
problem.  Many of these ecosystems are not defined hydrologically (e.g., the Pacific Northwest and the Southeast forest
ecosystems).  But others, including the Edwards, are defined hydrologically.
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While the ESA tries to guarantee conscious decisions on integrated ecosystem management, and often succeeds, it
cannot guarantee wise decisions.  A major barrier to sound integrated ecosystem management remains: most of the
decision-makers are given no guidance, and no constraints, on the way they integrate the various environmental and
non-environmental factors.
For example, the USDA has stumbled badly in implementing the Conservation Reserve Program.  Even though the
TWC chairman in 1992 described the Edwards as the state's most critical water problem, CRP has only been used to
retire 770 acres of Edwards-irrigated land (out of 35 million acres nationwide).  (12) In general, CRP money has
mainly been used for economic not environmental priorities -- to retire the most economically marginal cropland --
i.e., as an auxiliary part of USDA's productivity and farmer subsidy missions.  This is easy to understand, given
USDA's primary constituency and mission and inertia, compounded by the Farm Service Agency's farmer-income
orientation.
Part of the problem is that, as a society, we have only been thinking about how to integrate environmental concerns --
what the economists call "externalities" -- into our regulated market economy for a very short time.  We are early and
low on the learning curve, though moving up rapidly.
USDA again furnishes a good example.  The 1996 Farm Bill requires USDA to concentrate ECARP funds (the
successor to CRP and other conservation programs) in "conservation priority areas."  (13)  Under the statutory criteria,
the Edwards certainly qualifies.  Within "conservation priority areas," the USDA is now required to maximize
environmental benefits per dollar expended.  This should improve the odds that, in the future, substantial USDA
conservation money will go to Edwards irrigation water conservation and to conversion of irrigated cropland to dryland
cropping.
Many of the legal difficulties in working toward integrated water resource and other ecosystem management result from
failure to take full advantage of the market.  Surprisingly, environmentalists, not businesses, are largely responsible
for most of the progress we have made toward using the market.  Examples abound.  Environmentalists pointed out
that subsidizing irrigation water used to grow cotton (as BuRec has routinely done in the West for 100 years) and
subsidizing cotton under statutes that give more money to those who achieve greater yields (as the farm subsidy laws
did until 1985, and to some extent until 1996) is both environmentally perverse and economically irrational, and that
part of the environmental perversity is the economic irrationality.  The result is movement under a variety of new
federal statutes (such as the 1996 farm bill and the Central Valley Project Improvement Act) and existing ones toward
less destructive subsidies.
In the case of the Edwards, we are still a long way from taking full advantage of what a free market, regulated to
protect public interests in untraded benefits, can do, but we are moving in the right direction.  S.B. 1477 is a good
example (assuming as I do that the Texas Supreme Court will uphold its facial constitutionality).  (14)
Currently, in the Edwards, no pumper owns a meaningful property right to Edwards water.  But under S.B. 1477,
marketable rights to definable quantities (varying, as surface water rights do, with hydrological conditions) will be
protected by permit.  Market transfers by willing sellers to willing buyers, from lower-valued uses to higher-valued
uses, will go a long way toward easing the problems caused by over-drafting of the Edwards.  Readers are referred to
the article by Keplinger et al in this issue for an example of reallocation through market forces.  If the EAA limits the
permits to hydrologically safe total levels, and builds in an appropriate fee for the downstream impacts of all pumping,
the resulting market should largely solve the problems.
UPDATE
Since this paper was prepared and presented, there have been a number of Edwards-related developments.  In the
summer of 1996, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the constitutionality of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority statute.  (15)  Springflow levels dropped very sharply in the late summer of 1996.  The EAA's interim board,
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facing imminent election and severe political pressure, was unable to agree on action.  The federal court soon entered
a temporary injunction in the section 9 case, but the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal.  (7)  Late in
1996, under its first elected board and a new general manager, the EAA began the process of regulating pumping.  The
federal court ordered USDA to consult and plan, setting a November 1, 1996 deadline, but the Fifth Circuit stayed this
order pending appeal.  (9)  A San Antonio citizens' committee on water appointed by the Mayor issued a report stating
that San Antonio's reliance on the Edwards is a serious problem, both for itself and for the region, and that the problem
requires that a variety of approaches to solution be pursued simultaneously, including conservation, wastewater reuse,
purchase of agricultural water rights, and alternative water supplies; despite inclusion of the oft-rejected "springflow
augmentation" concept, the members of the committee associated with a particular mayoral candidate, with springflow
augmentation and with opposition to S.B. 1477 refused to sign.  San Antonio, GBRA and other regional entities joined
forces to carry out the first-ever "dry-year option," on a small scale.
The Edwards experiences and the impact of more widespread drought have also led to the filing, as the first bill in the
1997 legislative session, of a more general reform of Texas water law, S.B. 1.  If adopted (by no means certain), S.B.
1 would result in modest steps toward more integrated management of surface and ground water, involving
environmental consequences on springs and rivers as well as effects on other pumpers and diverters.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The application of the ESA to the Edwards highlights the importance of enforceable legal requirements that
decision-makers conduct integrated economic and environmental decision-making at the hydrological system
(or other ecosystem) level.  Otherwise, the geographic and subject-matter fragmentation of existing decision-
makers prevents integrated management.
(2) Defining property rights and integrating environmental externalities into the free market purchase and sale of
those property rights can solve integrated water resource and other ecosystem management problems.  The
Edwards Aquifer Authority Act of 1993, as modified in 1995, highlights this potential for the Edwards.
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